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Abstract 
Students’ capacity for making evaluative judgements of their own work is widely 
acknowledged as central to their learning within programmes as well as being vital to their 
subsequent professional practice. In higher education literature, the act of evaluative 
judgement is usually portrayed as a process of deliberative, analytical reasoning requiring 
student agency and objectivity, typically scaffolded by points of reference such as explicit 
criteria, rubrics or exemplars. This paper challenges this common portrayal of judgement by 
drawing attention to research from outside higher education on the role of unconscious 
factors in judgement and decision-making. Drawing from the field of heuristics and bias 
studies, the paper outlines six unconscious factors that have the potential to distort students’ 
analytical judgement of their work. A recent challenge to the heuristics and bias approach 
that radically repositions the place of reasoning in judgement is also considered. Since these 
unconscious factors have received scant attention in higher education literature, the purpose 
of this paper is to draw attention to them, to identify the challenges they pose to current 
understandings of evaluative judgement, and to outline their implications for enhancing 
assessment practice. 
Key words: student evaluative judgement; heuristics; self-assessment; bias; decision-making; 
reasoning 
 
Introduction 
Evaluative judgement, defined by Tai et al. (2017,1) as ‘the capability to make decisions 
about the quality of work of oneself and others’, has long been recognised in higher education 
literature as an important goal of any programme of study. This capacity to describe and 
appraise the quality of one’s work in relation to a standard or standards and to act on that 
appraisal to improve its quality is seen as essential if students are to become self-regulated 
learners within their programmes. Perhaps more importantly, this ability is considered crucial 
 
  
 
for students’ future roles as lifelong learners and competent practitioners able to monitor their 
performance and ongoing learning needs in their chosen fields once they have graduated 
(Boud 2000; Sadler 1989).  
 
Evaluative judgement lies at the heart of self-assessment, a broader construct to which 
various terms have been applied and which can be operationalised in many different ways 
utilising a broad range of pedagogical practices (Andrade & Brown 2016; Bourke 2014; 
Brown & Harris 2014). This paper focuses on the core construct of evaluative judgement 
though, as we shall see, some have argued that several self-assessment practices might be 
conscripted in its service. While there is a voluminous literature on self-assessment in higher 
education, the same cannot be said for evaluative judgement. Tai et al. point out that 
‘evaluative judgement is undertheorised and under-researched’ and that while its importance 
has been recognised by writers such as Sadler, it has not received focused attention and it has 
been the subject of very little empirical research (Tai et al. 2017, 2).  
 
Extant literature on evaluative judgement specifically and on closely related aspects of self-
assessment is, with few exceptions, predicated on an understanding of evaluative judgement 
as an analytical, deliberative process based on conscious reasoning. The purpose of this paper 
is to present a number of significant challenges to this understanding that have as yet received 
scant attention in the literature of higher education assessment, and to consider the 
implications of these challenges for both practice and research. Central to these challenges 
are a set of heuristics and biases that have become widely recognised in the field of 
judgement and decision making as having the capacity to distort judgement. Since these 
heuristics operate unconsciously, they stand in contrast to the normally understood analytical 
processes of evaluative judgement and may unknowingly influence how students engage in 
such judgement, how they may overvalue their work, and how their perceptions of the quality 
of their work may be distorted in other ways. While students can apply evaluative judgement 
to both their own work and that of others, this paper focuses on the former since the dynamics 
of judgement may function differently when the work being considered has been created by 
another person. It is acknowledged that the focus of self-assessment may not always be the 
work produced but rather students’ self-reflective judgements about the learning that has 
occurred (Bourke 2017). The focus of the present paper is firmly on the former. 
The paper’s starting point is in the predominant current understanding of evaluative 
judgement as a conscious, analytical process. The competing understanding of judgement as 
functioning within a ‘dual processing’ system of reasoning and thus being subject to 
potentially powerful unconscious influences is then introduced. Six such influences, drawn 
from the ‘heuristics and biases’ field of judgement and decision making studies, are 
summarised and their potential implications for student judgement are outlined. Since these 
particular heuristics and biases have received almost no attention in higher education 
research, these implications are necessarily speculative pending such research being 
undertaken. While space and the scope of this paper do not permit a critical analysis of these 
heuristics, one alternative explanation of the role of reason and unconscious or intuitive 
processes that has profound implications for student evaluative judgement is presented. 
Finally, the paper outlines ways of responding to the threats to evaluative judgement that 
these unconscious factors represent. 
 
Current understandings of evaluative judgement as an analytical process 
Understandings of student evaluative judgement developed over the past thirty years posit 
that, if students are to be effective learners and then effective practitioners of any kind, they 
need to be able to discern what is and is not good work and to identify this in the work they 
produce themselves. This requires pedagogical approaches involving student agency which 
   
 
seek ‘to reframe assessment … around the theme of informing judgement (see Hager & 
Butler 1996) that is, informing the capacity to evaluate evidence, appraise situations and 
circumstances astutely, to draw sound conclusions and act in accordance with this analysis’ 
(Boud 2007, 19).  
This understanding of student evaluative judgement is associated with three critical factors. 
The first of these is a high level of student agency or student ‘executive control’ over the 
production of work (Boud & Falchikov 2007; Sadler 1989). This agency is now commonly 
supported in practice by the second factor, the use of criteria-based frameworks (Cowan 
2010), often with student involvement in developing the criteria (Bourke 2017). The third 
factor is ‘objectivity’. Cowan describes this as ‘objective decision-making free of 
subjectivity’ rather than based on personal beliefs or feelings (Cowan 2010, 326), while 
Sadler recognises limits to objectivity by referring to a ‘proper degree of objectivity’ (Sadler 
1989, 130, emphasis added). The terms ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity’ are used deliberately 
here to suggest that students should be able to distance themselves from their work.  
The case for evaluative judgement and how it should function is often accompanied by 
descriptions of how it can be developed; few would see it as an inherent ability of students 
simply waiting to be activated. Sadler points out that ‘students can develop evaluative 
expertise in much the same way as they develop other knowledge and skills’ (Sadler 2009, 
49). Suggested strategies for development include peer learning (Abercrombie [1960] 1989; 
Tai, Canny, Haine & Molloy 2015), the use of criteria and rubrics to inform judgement, 
access to exemplars, and repeated experience of exercising judgement over time (see, for 
example, Boud, Lawson & Thomson 2015, 2013; Tai et al. 2017), with this experience 
leading to learning by comparing one’s own judgements to those of others, including peers 
and teachers. Feedback is invariably seen as central to developing evaluative expertise. 
Carless, for example, frames feedback as a complex dialogic process of learning designed to 
foster students’ evaluative judgement through ‘interactive exchanges in which interpretations 
are shared, meanings negotiated and expectations clarified’, the purpose being ‘to provide 
opportunities for students to interact around notions of quality and standards in the discipline’ 
(Carless 2013, 113). Tai et al. (2017) offer several suggestions regarding how commonly 
used strategies such as self-assessment, peer review, feedback, rubrics and exemplars can be 
re-purposed to develop evaluative judgement. 
Several writers have argued that the development of evaluative judgement should be an 
explicit component of higher education curricula, following Cowan’s advice that 
‘(e)stablishing the foundation of a sound methodology for the making of evaluative 
judgements which will inform subsequent action is an important early priority in curricula in 
higher education’ (Cowan 2010, 327). Brown and Harris (2014) have advocated a similar 
curricular approach to developing student judgement at the school level. While such curricula 
entail regular opportunities for students to exercise judgement, to compare their judgement to 
that of others, to develop a sense of disciplinary standards, and to become increasingly 
responsible for assessing their own work, some argue for the need to develop students’ 
reflexivity in recognition of evaluative judgement as an embodied process involving students’ 
beliefs, emotions and values (Boud & Falchikov 2007, 190).  
 
Threats to evaluative judgement from unconscious factors 
The understanding of student evaluative judgement and its development outlined in the 
previous section, with its focus on student agency, objectivity, and the conscious use by 
students of tools such as explicit criteria and rubrics, assumes that judgement is an 
intentional, deliberative process in which students pay attention to certain elements in their 
assessment environment and consciously evaluate their work in the light of these elements. In 
other words, student evaluative judgement is a systematic, analytical process. Such a 
 
  
 
deliberative, reasoned approach to judgement is well established in the literature on 
judgement and decision-making outside education (Buchanan & O’Connell 2005; Fox 2014; 
Over 2004). Within the limited higher education literature that addresses this issue, however, 
some disquiet about purely analytical approaches to student judgement has been expressed, 
with some writers drawing attention to difficulties with analytical approaches and noting the 
influence of non-analytical, unconscious, intuitive or idiosyncratic factors. Abercrombie, in 
her classic study of judgement by medical students, concluded that ‘(m)any factors of which 
we are unconscious influence our judgments, both in cases where we are not aware of making 
(as in seeing) and in those where we are (as in evaluating evidence from an experiment). It is 
postulated that we might make more valid judgments if we could become conscious of some 
of these factors’ (Abercrombie [1960] 1989, 182, emphasis added). Sadler made a similar 
observation in relation to programme evaluation when he observed that ‘(w)hatever its other 
strengths, the mind is apt to make errors of judgment and inference’ (Sadler 1981, 25) though 
he did not elaborate on this somewhat important point. More recently, Yan and Brown have 
noted the role of intuition in student judgement, pointing out that ‘it is possible that in self-
assessment, completely idiosyncratic heuristics might be used to evaluate work …’ (Yan & 
Brown 2017, 1248). Brown, Andrade and Chen (2015), in pointing out that ‘research into the 
human ability to self-evaluate work raises concerns about the quality of students’ judgments 
…’ (Brown, Andrade & Chen 2015, 444), refer explicitly to several leading authors in the 
field of heuristics and biases which will be considered in the following section of this paper. 
Despite the misgivings of Sadler, Abercrombie, Brown and others, the understanding of 
student evaluative judgement as an analytical process has prevailed. This understanding is 
essentially normative, prescribing how evaluative judgement should function and how it 
should be developed. Countless studies of actual judgement and decision making in various 
fields have now identified a range of systematic ‘errors of judgement and inference’ that can 
distort the analytic approach so that the field of research known as ‘heuristics and biases’ 
now sits alongside decision analysis as a leading approach to understanding judgement and 
decision making (Fox 2014; Phillips, Klein & Sieck 2004). These factors have been applied 
to decision making and judgement in a range of disciplinary and professional contexts, as 
well as in everyday life, but have received relatively little attention within higher education. 
The literature of this field is voluminous and it is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to 
summarise it. Scholarly overviews can be found in Gilovich and Griffin (2002), and Keren 
and Teigen (2004), and in the work of the Nobel Laureates: Kahneman’s lengthy but 
accessible ‘Thinking, Fast and Slow’ (Kahneman 2011), and Thaler’s ‘Misbehaving’ (Thaler 
2015).  
A critical idea in relation to the distinction between heuristics and biases on the one hand and 
analytical approaches on the other lies in ‘dual processing’ theories of reasoning, designated 
by Stanovich and West as ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ thinking (Stanovich & West 2000) and 
subsequently widely adopted within psychology and other fields (see, for example, Evans 
2008; Evans & Frankish 2009; Osman 2004; Stanovich 2010). Stanovich and West 
characterise System 1 as ‘automatic, largely unconscious, and relatively undemanding of 
computational capacity’, combining automaticity and heuristic processing, while System 2, in 
contrast, is essentially analytical and characterised by ‘controlled processing’ (Stanovich & 
West 2000, 658). Within this framework, heuristics are associated with System 1 ways of 
thinking and are commonly defined as ‘rules of thumb’ or ‘mental shortcuts’ to decision 
making and judgement. (They should therefore not be confused with other uses of this term, 
for example discovery approaches to learning, or trial-and-error or experimental methods of 
problem solving.) However, heuristics lead to what should be seen as provisional rather than 
definitive answers and may be prone to error. They are thus contrasted with analytically 
based algorithms ‘which are explicit and detailed rules that guarantee a correct result, but 
could be effortful and time-consuming, and hence impractical in situations characterized by 
   
 
limited cognitive resources’ (Keren & Teigen 2004, 92). Keren and Teigen provide a useful 
definition of ‘bias’ associated with System 1 as 
systematic deviation from a norm (or an inclination towards one judgment 
rather than another). Biases can be the result of cognitive limitations, 
processing strategies, perceptual organizing principles, an egocentric 
perspective, specific motivations, affects, and cognitive styles. In the 
heuristics and biases tradition, the general approach has been to regard 
biases as a more or less regular by-product of some more general 
principles of judgment, labeled heuristics … (Keren & Teigen 2004, 92).  
‘Bias’ thus has a particular meaning in the context of this paper. It should not be confused 
with prejudices or predispositions but refers simply to the result of unconscious shortcuts to 
judgement which occur under certain conditions. These shortcuts, typically applied due to 
human or contextual factors, may lead to sound outcomes and the intuitive judgement of 
experienced experts, based on ‘pattern recognition’ (Simon 1955), can be highly accurate. 
However, they can often lead to outcomes that diverge from the results of more conscious, 
analytical approaches (Kahneman & Klein 2009; Tversky & Kahneman 1974).  
The System 1/System 2 distinction challenges the overarching assumption that evaluative 
judgement is based on a high level of student agency or executive control, that is, that 
judgement is driven by System 2. System 1 and its associated heuristics and biases are 
unconscious, automatic responses and so, by definition, lie beyond ‘executive control’. That 
is not to say they are completely out of control, but it does suggest that the analytical 
processes of judgement may be tempered by unconscious factors of the kind referred to by 
Abercrombie as noted earlier in this section. If this is the case, the analytical processes of 
student evaluative judgement may be at least partly compromised in ways that are not 
obvious to either students or teachers. 
When students are engaged in judging their own work, we do not want them to be distracted, 
consciously or otherwise, by extraneous considerations that could interfere with sound 
judgement. Rather, we want them to be focused on the work that is in front of them, seeing it 
as clearly as possible, relating that work to standards that are well understood and which 
function as clear signposts, and evaluating their work accordingly. A better understanding of 
factors that might impinge on that focus is called for. The following section therefore 
considers six specific heuristics and how they might interfere with a more deliberative 
approach to student evaluative judgement.  
 
Heuristics and biases in student evaluative judgement 
While dozens of heuristics and biases have been identified in the literature on judgement and 
decision making (see, for example, Arkes & Hammond 1986; Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman 
2002; Keren & Wu 2015), a small number appear to have particular potential to compromise 
students’ evaluative judgement of their work. The heuristics discussed below have been 
selected due to their potential (a) to limit students’ engagement with an evaluative task, (b) to 
lead students to overvalue their work in relation to standards, or (c) to result in students 
having an unwarranted confidence in what they have produced. 
‘Attribute substitution’. According to this heuristic, when confronted with a difficult, 
complex problem, we may unconsciously substitute a simpler problem for which we can find 
an answer. Kahneman refers to this as ‘answering an easier question’ (Kahneman 2011, 97). 
Put more technically, ‘… judgment is mediated by a heuristic when an individual assesses a 
specified target attribute of a judgment object by substituting another property of that object ˗ 
the heuristic attribute ˗ which comes more readily to mind’ (Kahneman & Frederick 2002, 
 
  
 
53). Our concern here is whether students, asked to evaluate their work by applying a 
complex rubric or a criterion they do not understand, might respond by unconsciously 
simplifying the task. For example, instead of answering the question, ‘How well did I do 
against this criterion?’, they may unconsciously substitute the question, ‘How much effort did 
I invest in relation to this criterion?’  
‘Framing’ refers to one’s conception of a task, its intended outcomes and the implications of 
those outcomes. Framing arises from both how a task is presented and how it is perceived and 
is thus influenced by both the task per se and its context. How one frames an evaluative task 
can have a significant impact on how one responds to the task, that is, to the judgement or 
decision one is called on to make (Kahneman & Tversky 1984; Soman 2004). Any given task 
can be presented in different ways, and any given presentation of a task can be perceived 
differently. The impact of framing has been powerfully demonstrated in relation to complex 
judgements in medical (Chapman 2004) and financial contexts (Tversky & Kahneman 1981) 
amongst others. We might expect how an evaluative judgement task is framed by teachers 
and how this is perceived by students to strongly influence how students approach the task. 
For example, an evaluative task may be presented as an opportunity for important learning or 
as a competition with peers, and its context may range from its being inconsequential to 
future activities to being a major driver for a subsequent piece of assessment. Moreover, pre-
specified criteria, rubrics and exemplars as aides to judgement all have the potential to 
strongly frame the evaluative judgement task and may thus both narrow students’ attention 
and limit their development of holistic judgement which will be particularly important when 
they enter the field of practice post-graduation. 
‘Overconfidence’ plays a major role in misjudgement and flawed decisions and is linked to 
numerous other factors affecting judgement (Lovallo & Kahneman 2003; Saks & Kidd 
1986). Overconfidence concerns our tendency to overrate the quality of our work, decisions 
or judgement and is based on how coherent a view of our judgement we have. This 
coherence may be unrelated to any objective standard but simply relies on a subjective sense 
that we have done a good job and can tell ourselves and/or others a convincing story about it. 
More information might challenge that sense so that, paradoxically, we may be more 
confident if we have less rather than more information to guide our judgement. Accordingly, 
the overconfidence heuristic should be expected to lead students to overvalue their work, 
with less knowledgeable students more prone to this than their better informed and hence 
more uncertain peers. In fact, as the well-documented Dunning-Kruger effect shows, the 
effect on students is more nuanced, with lower performing students tending to exaggerate 
their grades while higher performing students tend to do the opposite (Andrade & Brown 
2016; Kruger & Dunning 1999). This phenomenon provides a rare instance of research into 
an unconscious heuristic in higher education.   
‘The endowment effect’ and ‘the IKEA effect’. These effects concern our tendency to 
overvalue what we have come to own or what we have created ourselves. The endowment 
effect, so named by Thaler (1980, 2015) and closely related to Tversky and Kahneman’s 
extensively researched ‘prospect theory’ (Kahneman & Tversky 1984; Tversky & Kahneman 
1974) posits that we attach more value to an object if we have a sense of ownership than if 
we do not. The IKEA effect is less well researched but its meaning is self-evident: the 
increased valuing of products we have constructed ourselves compared to those constructed 
by others (Norton, Mochon & Ariely 2012). These effects should be expected to inflate 
students’ judgements of work in which they have a strong personal investment and/or which 
represent a significant effort or act of creation. The effects may apply not only to how highly 
a piece of work is valued, but also to the student’s judgement itself once that judgement has 
been made, so that students may not only over-rate their work but also hold more strongly to 
their evaluation of it. 
   
 
‘Anchoring and adjustment.’ This heuristic refers to the tendency to use a given value as a 
starting point and then adjust our judgement from that point. The initial value or anchor exerts 
a strong pull such that our adjustments are typically not sufficient given the actual quality of 
what is being evaluated (Tversky & Kahneman 1974, 1128). The effect of this heuristic on 
second marker judgement has been documented by Brookes (2012). When students are 
evaluating their own work, four sets of apparently useful points of reference may act as 
anchors: verbal descriptors of standards; exemplars; the work of peers; and their own previous 
work. Thus, for example, students advised of an expected class average of 80% would be 
more likely to rate their work as closer to 80% than students advised of an expected class 
average of 50% or students not advised of any average. A similar dynamic may occur in 
relation to their evaluations with respect to individual criteria and standards. In other words, 
the presence of particular exemplars, criteria and standards statements may ironically work to 
distort rather than promote accurate judgement.  
‘The law of least effort.’ This heuristic assumes that we are working in the right direction, but 
that our attention and energy are finite and that we therefore tend to choose the means of 
achieving a goal that requires the least effort. This is not simply out of laziness but may be 
due to factors such as a need for efficiency when confronted by numerous demands, limits to 
how many elements of a situation we can give focused attention to, or the emotional effort 
involved in self-assessment (Kahneman 2011; Simon 1978). As Kahneman puts this, ‘(t)he 
evidence is persuasive: activities that impose high demands on System 2 require self-control, 
and the exertion of self-control is depleting and unpleasant’ (Kahneman 2011, 42). This 
heuristic has several possible implications for students’ evaluative judgement. For example, if 
judgement requires attention to too many factors either simultaneously or sequentially, 
students may find their capacity to attend to these diminishing as they work through them. 
Moreover, if evaluative judgement is required at the end of a complex assessment task or is 
seen as peripheral to the main task, it may be done reluctantly and with limited energy and 
attention. If such judgement can be undertaken through several more or less intensive means, 
students may tend to opt for the most straightforward and avoid the more demanding.  
The heuristics outlined in this section raise significant issues about the limits to student 
evaluative judgement as a purely conscious, deliberative, analytical process. The threat to 
analytical judgement arising from the heuristics considered in this section can be summarised 
as follows: 
• If a requirement to evaluate work appears too complex, too difficult to understand, or 
too demanding, ‘attribution substitution’ may come into play, with students distorting 
the task by ‘answering an easier question’. 
• How students frame an evaluative judgement task will strongly influence how they go 
about it. 
• Overconfidence can lead less informed students to overvalue their work. 
• Students may overvalue their work if they have a strong sense of ownership of what 
they have produced. 
• Exemplars may act as anchors for judgement from which students make insufficient 
adjustment in comparing their own work. 
• If the requirements of evaluative judgement are too onerous, students may give it 
insufficient attention, with ‘the law of least effort’ coming into play. 
 
While research has not been conducted to establish whether these predicted phenomena 
actually occur in higher education students, their established presence in other domains 
suggests they may well be present and warrants our considering how the threat they 
potentially represent might be countered.  
 
  
 
 
Countering threats to evaluative judgement: implications for teaching 
Earlier in this paper the need to actively develop students’ capacity for evaluative judgement 
as a conscious, analytical process was noted and a number of developmental strategies were 
outlined. In light of the threats to evaluative judgement considered in the previous section, we 
now need to consider how these threats might be dealt with. While the previously mentioned 
strategies seek to improve the accuracy and calibration of student judgement, the strategies 
listed in this section focus specifically on countering the bias associated with the heuristics 
presented in the previous section. The term commonly used for this in the judgement and 
decision making literature is ‘debiasing’ (see, e.g., Crosskerry et al. 2013; Larrick 2004). 
Related terms such as ‘accuracy’ (Brown, Andrade & Chen 2015) and ‘calibration’ (Yan & 
Brown 2017) have particular and somewhat different connotations. 
The literature on decision making and judgement is not particularly helpful here; since 
heuristics and the biases associated with them are unconscious and automatic, they are 
particularly difficult to address. Indeed, Kahneman concludes that ‘System 1 is not readily 
educable’ and that ‘little can be achieved without a considerable investment of effort’ 
(Kahneman 2011, 417). Larrick, in a promisingly titled chapter on ‘debiasing’, reaches a 
similar conclusion that ‘there are many reasons to doubt that lone individuals can debias 
themselves’ (Larrick 2004, 318). Interestingly Brown, Andrade and Chen, in their review of 
the literature on accuracy in self-assessment, are slightly less pessimistic regarding accuracy. 
While noting the importance of helping students who are inaccurate assessors to improve 
their self-evaluations, they note that ‘(o)n closer inspection, such an approach is shown to be 
somewhat complicated’ (Brown, Andrade & Chen 2014, 450).  
The underlying problem with a debiasing agenda is that it would rely on students learning to 
recognise when they are in a situation where biases might be an issue but, since we are 
dealing with unconscious processes, such recognition is highly unlikely. As a result of this 
inherent difficulty, recommendations for dealing with bias typically involve developing 
strategies where the more thoughtful, analytical processes of ‘System 2’ thinking will be 
triggered (Larrick 2004; Phillips, Klein & Sieck 2004; Soll, Milkman & Payne 2015a, 
2015b). One such strategy applied to students would hold them accountable for their 
judgements by requiring them to justify or explain their judgements to others, thereby 
encouraging them to anticipate and address flaws in their judgements that may be identified 
by their peers or teacher (Larrick 2004, 322). Requiring justification not only triggers 
analytical thought but may also ensure students have engaged in the evaluative task as set 
rather than ‘answering an easier question’ or following the path of least effort since attention 
and effort must be sustained across the requirements of the justification process. Some, 
however, have noted that justifications can be biased rationalisations of a flawed intuitive 
response rather than constituting a corrective counter to it (Mercier & Sperber 2017; Vaisey 
2009).  
Processes that require students to compare their own judgements of their work with the 
judgements of others can be used to address overconfidence and the overvaluing of work due 
to a sense of ownership or the act of creation. One practice to assist students to gain critical 
distance on their own work is through having them make judgements about the work of a 
peer before turning to their own work. Such peer assessment as a means of developing 
evaluative judgement can occur in relation to specific pieces of work as well as in less formal 
group discussion (Abercrombie [1960] 1989; Tai, Canny, Haines & Molloy 2015).  
The framing of evaluative judgement requires careful attention. Framing judgement in terms 
of future professional practice should encourage students as would-be practitioners to take 
judgement tasks seriously and enable them to deploy more cues in assisting them in making 
   
 
their judgements. At the same time, the judgement process should not be too complicated in 
order to avoid depletion of attention and the search for less effortful pathways. 
Developing reflexivity as part of developing students as reflective practitioners supports all of 
the above suggestions. The awareness of how we exercise our subjectivity, including our 
beliefs and assumptions, biases and preconceptions, when judging our own work, would be 
central to this. Developing such awareness and at the same time developing an appreciation 
of the perspectives of others and how alternative perspectives might open us to seeing our 
work differently, are cornerstones of learning and practice. Equally importantly, they serve to 
make us more aware of unconscious processes at work in our judgements. Simple processes 
such as requiring students to incorporate the views of peers in their evaluative judgements 
may help develop the capacity for such reflexivity. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper began with a recognition that, while the development of students’ capacity for 
evaluative judgement has been recognised as crucial for their current and future learning as 
well as for effective practice in their chosen field of work, what constitutes evaluative 
judgement and how this ability is best formed has been relatively under-theorised and under-
researched within higher education. This paper has drawn attention to a fundamental aspect 
of evaluative judgement which has been largely ignored in the higher education literature, 
namely the influence of heuristics and associated biases that seem likely to limit students’ 
capacity to apply thoughtful, analytical processes of judgement to the evaluation of their own 
work. While such biases have been extensively researched in many fields outside education 
as well as receiving attention in relation to the school sector, to date they have received little 
attention within higher education where an assumption that students will unproblematically 
engage in rational, objective, analytical processes of self-assessment has prevailed. 
The absence of empirical research on this aspect of judgement in higher education means that 
the suggestions made in this paper are speculative, though the prominence of heuristics and 
biases within the field of judgement and decision making warrants giving them serious 
consideration. There is clearly a need for research into unconscious factors in student 
evaluative judgement, including the role played by current assessment practices such as the 
use of rubrics and exemplars in framing judgement, how students experience complex self-
assessment requirements that tax their energy and attention, the influence of assessment tasks 
that engender a strong sense of ownership of work produced, and students’ perceptions of 
evaluative judgement in highly pressured assessment contexts where producing good work, 
let alone evaluating it, becomes problematic. 
The perspectives introduced in this paper contribute to our understanding of student 
judgement by supplementing rather than supplanting existing understanding, while making 
evaluative judgement and its development in higher education more complex and challenging 
than previously thought. The factors discussed in this paper have the capacity to distort, not 
destroy, student judgement and it should not be claimed that a propensity towards bias 
renders evaluative judgement invalid. Such biases are intrinsic to the human condition and we 
have to find ways of assisting students to manage them. Work towards this may begin with a 
recognition that many self-assessment practices risk leaving biases untouched or, indeed, 
reinforced, by failing to recognise their presence. The inclusion of heuristics and biases in 
any curricular approach to developing students’ capacity for evaluative judgement would be 
an important first step. 
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